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Establishment of Centralised Financial Services 
for Countries now comprising the 
West Indies Associated States 
For some years there has been debate about expanding the functions 
of the ECCA to include some central banking functions; and in fact 
draft text of instruments for revising the ECCA agreement had been 
prepared and examined by Ministers of the Associated States. There has 
been no substantial progress towards final decisions on the terms of a 
new agreement governing the operations of ECCA. 
In the meantime individual states haye initiated and are operating 
exchange controls under the co-ordinating aegis of the ECCA which in 
addition still performs its primary functions as Currency Authority. 
It is understood that already several of the states have applied 
to the IMF for membership in anticipation of independence. The precedent 
for this seems to be the action taken by Grenada on gaining her 
independence» It .is also understood that IMF would be inclined to 
propose the creation of a Regional Central Bank to serve all the 
countries. A draft instrument along these lines exists. 
Progress has been inhibited by considerations of the relationship 
of the Central Bank to individual Governments, including the extent to 
which Ministers of Finance would need to forego certain functions and 
have them vested in a regional body. One mu$t recognize too the 
individual aspirations of each state, that it might itself provide the 
widest possible range of "central banking" services of which it is 
capable» In part this relates to the need for a measure of regulation 
of commercial banking activity within the national boundary, which is 
an essential element of economic strategy. 
An alternative solution 
Whatever formulation is considered must commence by taking into 
accounts 
i) the existence of a single currency (EC$);. 
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ii) the existence and operations of the currency-
authority -which is serving all the countries5 
iii) existing machinery at individual state level for 
exchange control purposes5 
iv) the existence in some cases and the long term 
necessity for national commercial hanking functions; 
v) the strong objections that surround the question 
of inevitable division of functions and authority 
between Ministers of Finance and a Regional 
Central Bank; 
vi) the prestige of being independent and providing 
services on the basis of internal institutional 
structure. 
The recommendation so far has been the standard one of establish-
ing a Central Bank, except that in this case it be regional serving 
the group of countries» This raises more problems than it solves. 
Central to the whole exercise is the fact that though a single policy 
line might be accepted, in each country there has to be some particular 
adjustments In fact some aspects of a Regional Central Bank market-
operations would be ineffective, because of the variations in levels 
of development and structures of the economies. A more innovative 
approach has to be adopted. 
It is here proposed that the "central banking" functions be 
vested in a Reserve System» In such a system it becomes possible to 
devise a division of functions between those operations which need to 
be effected on collective basis, and other operations which need to 
be effected on individual basis, i.e. at national level. Clearly, with 
a single currency any change of exchange rate affects the whole group 
©f countries, and such action therefore needs to be taken collectively; 
consequently this should be a function of the reserve system. Similarly, 
any fiscal measure that has to be implemented, can be implemented only 
through national legislation at national level. In the event that 
fiscal measures form part of collective adjustment machinery within a 
package of actions for correcting balance of payments, two steps are 
necessarys (a) co-ordination at Reserve System or collective level, 
and (o) implementation at individual (i.e. national) level. The 
majority of specific actions, whether fiscal or market, can he 
implementad only tkrough national legislation and "by the national 
administrations, (there is no regional Parliament and the extent of 
any ."ticalar kind of action will vary from country to country). 
The solution therefore is that these functions he divided between 
national units which derive their co-ordination from the Reserve 
System. 
A method for establishing and operating the national units is 
already conveniently to hand. Some of the countries already have 
national banks? those that do not, will soon follow suit and establish 
their era. In any event it is necessary that national banks exist so 
as to provide a basis for regulating the activities of branches of 
expatriate banks. It will inevitably develop that all the countries 
will have national banks with commercial banking operations. The 
proposal would be that the national bank should have two departments? 
a Reserve System Department and a Commercial Banking Department. The 
commercial banking department would function as a normal commercial 
"bankp while the reserve system department would have the functions of 
exchange control and some market operations. All the reserve system 
departments taken together would comprise the banking department of a 
normal central bank. 
The Reserve System would have the main responsibility for 
co-ordinating the range of functions to be performed at the national 
level (by the reserve system departments) with the range of functions 
that are undertaken collectively by the countries. The Reserve System 
could have as its governing body a Board of Governors comprising the 
Ministers responsible for Finance in the individual countries. The 
1/ Board of Governors would be served by a small secretariat of technicians 
* Except of course changes in the Exchange rate. 
y Aside from the basic research activities which span and serve 
both the "currency department" and "banking department" aspects 
the secretariat would be the focal point for co-ordinating 
banking activities. 
- 4 - \ 
who would perform inter alia the functions normally entrusted to the 
Research Department in any central hank. 
The aaaas Minister, "being responsible for the Finance Portfolio, 
would "bf the "'ag3nt!? for his country, and in respect of the reserve 
system department of the national hank, he the link for fiscal and 
au;:_.eT.ary policies» 
Tfcs ECCA would remain as the currency authority of the Reserve 
System performing the functions of a currency department of any normal 
central hank and co-ordinating the collective aspects of exchange control. 
Conments 
The above constitutes a rudimentary outline for the sort of 
institution that would hold out a possibility of meeting the political 
realities. The dual role of the Minister, at the level of the Reserve 
System and at the national level, takes care of some aspects of the 
division of functions and authority, one aspect that attracts strong 
objection in the Regional Central Bank kind of approach. 
At the same time, the Reserve System formula has the immediate 
advantage of building on what exists, by taking into its scope the 
machinery and expertise that exists. This is relevant in terms of the 
additional costs that establishment of functions associated with central 
banking will attract anyhow. The Reserve System approach provide a way 
of broadening the services without exorbitant costs. It also reduces 
the problem of agreement on cost sharing formulae. 
Of considerable importance is the consideration that there is the 
probability it would be more functionally efficient that a regional 
central bank located in one of the countries, in that it would have 
"fingers" within the individual countries through which it could 
operate. The national units (i.e. reserve system departments) would in 
each case be automatically geared to the needs of the country. The 
Regional Central Bank alternative would in any event need to establish 
some kind of national agency. 
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